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Abstract
One of the main important uses of Internet is its ability to connect people through the use of email or
Internet storage. However, it is often desirable to limit the use of email or Internet storage clue to
organization's restriction, avoiding spams, etc. In this paper, we propose cryptographic schemes that can
be used to stop unwanted messages to be stored in the Internet server. We refer this technique as privacy
enhancement for Internet storage, since the Internet server will not learn any information directed to its
users, other than performing its task to deliver or stop the messages. Firstly, we describe a notion of noninteractive publicly verifiable 1-out-of-n encryption by proposing a model together with its security
requirements. Then, we extend this notion to a publicly verifiable ring-to-1-out-of-n encryption, that
provides sender anonymity. We note that the previously known interactive versions of the publicly
verifiable 1-out-of-n encryption cannot be used to construct publicly verifiable ring-to-1-out-of-n
encryption.
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Abstract
One of the
important uses Internet is its ability to
connect people through the
of
or internet storage. However; it is
desirable to limit the use
or Internet storage due to
restriction,
ing
etc. In this
we propose cryptographic
schemes that
be used to stop
to be
stored in the Internet
We refer this technique
vacy enhancement for Internet storage, since the Internet
will not learn any
directed to its users.
other
its task to deliver or stop the messages. Firstly, w e describe notion of
publicly verifiable
encryption by proposing a
together with its
Then, we extend this
notion to publicly verifiable ring-to- -out-of-n encryption, that provides sender anonymity. We note that the previously known interactive versions
publicly
encryption cannot be used to construct publicly
ring-to- I-out-of-n

Internet storage.
publicly
encryption, publicly
ring-to-I out-of n encryption.
of knowledge

1. Introduction
The public Internet can be considered as a world
wide computer network, that is, a network that interconnects millions of computing devices throughout
the world. Most of these devices are traditional desktop
based workstations,
tops, tablet
handheld devices and so forth. Among
them, there are servers that store and transinit information such as web pages and
messages One of the
most important uses of Internet is its ability to connect people through the use of
or Internet storage. However.

it is often desirable to
the use
or Internet storage due to
restriction. avoiding spams,
etc
Consider a situation where there is an Internet storage
a group of
that can be used to store messages directed
this situation. it would be desirable to install a
users,
secure gateway to stop all messages that are not directed
to its group members in
will act as a mediator
a sender and a receiver of message in group
Alice
to send a public-key encrypted message to Bob,
who is member of
then must be able to check that
the message is directed to a group member in and store
the message in the Internet storage. However, the problem
does not hold Bob’s
key This problem has
considered
to create an anonymous ad
group In
of the
this scenario. by knowing only the public
must deterniine if the encrypted ingroup members in
coming data is for a group member in without being able
to identify the actual recipient Moreover. the other member in 1’,together with itself, must not be able to read the
message
to Bob. In
(or subsequently revised in
this problem
been considered as publicly
able -out-of-n encryption
scheme. and they proposed an interactive protocol for
in
In a different
Alice does not want her identity
to be revealed Instead. she would like to send a message
to Bob on behalf of a group, which can be
Suppose Alice is a worker in insurance company who would
like to send a message to Bob. then the message is considered to belong to the company instead of
sent by
Alice The situation becomes more complex than the original scenario mentioned earlier. since cannot
an
interactive protocol with Alice, and hence, the notion of
PVlnE essential and required We note
that this scenario is essential, especially rf we would like to
protect Alice’s
Without having to assume that an
routing (eg MIX-nets) exists. then the existence
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of

is essential
a Prover (or Sender.respectively) wishes to send a public-key encrypted message
a Receiver through a Verifier The Prover
a group that consists of the Receiver
together with other people that belong to the same group
as the Receiver Then, the
conducts a
public-key encryption for the group of receivers in such a
way that the public verifier can be sure that the message
be decrypted by one of the receivers the group. It is
that
the Verifier cannot
the message,
2) the Verifier cannot identify to whom the message is
ier does not need to
designated to, and 3) the
form an interactive piotocol with the Prover to check
validity of the message

2.1. Signature of Knowledge

Representation

a non-interactive

Our Contribution
The schcme used in

is based on the
and-choose
hence,
between sender
and verifier are required. this paper, we firstly provide a
notion of a Non-Interactive Publicly Verifiable 1-out-of-n
Encryption
and propose a non-interactive
employing a cut-and-choose technique that
schcme
satisfies our model Then. we extend this notion to create a Publicly Verifiable
-out-of-n Encryption
(PVRTE) Scheme We shall point out that the interactive version of PVlnE
be used to generate a
construcPVRTE schcme We also provide a
tion of PVRTE schemes
any PVlnE schemes.
provide a complete security proof for our schemes

1.1. Sotations
Throughout this paper. we will
the following notations. The ring of integers modulo a number is denoted by
and the
subgroup of integers relatively
to
Let denote a
operator that concatenates two bit strings inputs. The inputs will be converted to its binary representation where its length is
by a security parameter

2. Cryptographic Tools

signature of knowledge
was proposed i n
We will use the following definition of signature of
knowledge from
The

Definition

is

[3]

(c.

knowledge
to the base

{0,

the discrete
of

is

An
=
can be computed if
is
by selecting a
the value (secret key) =
random integer
and computing =
niod and
then and according to

and
=

-

y).

This is also known as a
edge

3.2. Ring

proof of the knowl-

Schemes

We adopt the notations proposed in
to define ring signature schemes. We note that the ring signature schemes are
referred to -out-of-n in

Definition 2

A
signature
algorithms
1" A probabilistic

thut takes
private key

public

the one

A probabilistic
takes
list L that
public
corresponds to
outputs

In this section, we will review some cryptographic tools,
new cryptographic primitogether with
tives, that will be used throughout this paper.
be a large prime and = 2q- be also a
Let
be a finite cyclic group of pnme
Let 9 ,
be
of
Let y be a generator of such that
two
computing discrete logarithms ot any group element (apart
from the identity element) with respect to one of the generators is infeasible Let
(0,
denote a
strong collision-resistant hash function

{True or
A
rithrn
message
arid a
and
either True or
accept or
reject, respectively. It is required to
True +L ) with &inoverwhelming

A ring that allows a mixture of factorization and
based public keys has been constructed in [
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log

3. A New Signature of Knowledge for Proving
Equality of Discrete Logarithm and Double
Discrete Logarithm
In this section, we extend the notion of signature of
the previous section to signature
knowledge mentioned
of knowledge for proving equality of
and
discrete logarithm.
{O.

A

b?

..

One can verify that the resulting tuple
isfies
verification equation.

sat-

Based on the above signature of knowledge. we
tend it to
:
= </"
=
.. .
defined as follows.

ex-

Definition 4 A
noted

de-

,

.

is
:

A

discrete
double discrete

is

rhr

to
to

to the
signature of knowledge is represented by
..
satisfying equation
.. .

of

discrete

This signature of knowledge i s represented by
..
whcre
be a
security parameter, satisfying equation

I!

=

with
=

=

otherwise

)

Note that =
To compute the
tions must hold
The

{

of knowledge, three condi-

of

=

of

=

is

known.
known

holds
We

an upper hound on the length of
signature of knowledge

that

e
as follows
Firstly, compute the

for

of

- 1,
.
The signature of knowledge can only be
one
of the
known, whcre
and
can be computed as follows Without losing generality, we assume that the prover knows where
and = log, (

Firstly, select

2. Then. select
.

1random numbers.
- 1)

3 Select
4 For

I'

2.

,

Z,

compute

=

with randomly chosen r ,
{0,
where
be constant. Then, select a random r
and compute as

.

=

for

=

.

5.
c

=

I ,

I ,

0

-

otherwise.

-

and
=

)

6. Compute

Finally, we set the following values

.

random numbers,

I
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(I)

.

algorithm, the plaintext
ways be obtained. We

7. Let

C

can al-

-

4

One

verify t h a t
resulting tuple
satisfies
verification equation.

Having observed several
V
a ciphertext is diiectcd to.

..

... .

Non-Interactive Publicly Verifiable
Encryption

A

scheme involves three entities, namely a
Prover
(or Sender. iespectively). a Verifier
and a Receiver
There are three algorithm involved. namely a probabilistic algorithm: Verifiable
Encryption
a
algorithm.
Verification
accepts

inputs a
parameter
a message
public-key encryptions
By
vohing Verifiable Encryption (VE)
it
that can only be deciphered by
outputs a valid
one
secret keys
associated with
1
V
a
together with all
keys
, By invoking the Verification
it outputs {True
The output is True
which
it
be able to be decrypted by one of
secret
1
otherwise i t outputs
the output is
discarded (since it is tagged
‘invalid’)
accepts a
obtains the plaintext
by
invoking the Decryption
algorithm

Security Requirements
text

prover
that will pass

to produce an invalid cipheris negligible

4.2.

observe to

Notions

In terms of security of
scheme. we
to
two types of attackers. namely
and insider attacks
call an attack to be an
if
the attack is launched by an adversary who either compromises one of the player in the system, namely a receiver
= 1,
a sender or a
We will describe the attacks launched
these players in more detail later. An outsider attack is an attack that is
by an “outsider”,
we dewho is not one of the player in the system.
fine these
as follows
Let A be an outside attacker, whose running time is
bounded by
that
polynomial
a security
ter We require that

In
following, we define three differen: attacks launched
by insiders W e relate these attacks with the sccurity notions for the
in the system
the security for
sender defined as follows
require that if message is encrypted and
for
user R,, 1
then any other receiver
will
encrypted message We
that
not he able to read

SLY

will not have any knowledge about the plaintext
the
test

he
If both

and

.
are honest. at the execution of the

The main role o f the verifier i s to make sure that the encrypted message
to one of the receivers in
group Hence,
the security for the verifier is defined a5 follows Consider an attacker A who would like to
send an encrypted message to a person,
(1
H IS intention is to make the verifier believes that this
sage is intended to one of the receiver
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We say
attack is
the receiver
that
1
the mecsage is directed to one o f the
attack explained as follows The attacker
wants to flood" the
with
so
at
stage. the
will collapse
the messages will
be
in the
but no receiver
retrieve
i t . The
probability of this attack is bounded by

Wc note

this security notion is
to
first
rcquircmcnt mentioned earlier. We also note that this
attack is often referred
the
c
this attack, the
A
tries
to
encrypted
directed to a receiver
Intuitively, 4 would like to reject valid en1
crypted
directed to
but
accept all other
valid encrypted
directed to
receivers
security notion as "IND-PV
Wc formally
SCCA" (SCCA = "Signer Chosen Ciphertext Attack") as
follows

Definition

Let A be
is bounded by that is
in
A
the view of the verifier: We

4.3. The Scheme
this section, we propose non-interactive PV
based on the building blocks
in the previous
The scheme is 3 5 follows
SetupLet
and
a cyclic group of order and
with
receiver
a random

+

=
1 Let
be
be an elcinent of

sets his public key to

Verifiable Encrypticn
a message
key
&
(that is one of
does the following
1 Selects a random element y from
2 Computes
A =

the pub-

=

3. Sets the ciphertext to be.

A,
A=
Verification
To verify a ciphertext, the

A

tests whether
=

consider

1

is correct
wise. outputs

-

then it

A receiver R,.1
with
key D ,
computing

True. Other-

holds the correct secret
can decrypt the
by
=

Then. R , needs to verify whether I' =
If
holds with equality, then
obtains the plaintext

it

4.4. Security Analysis
decrypt the
is

Theorem (Security against Outsider Attacks).
exists
phertext
key

s

Theorem 2 (Security for the Sender).
attacker
to
directed to the
a
secret

of

2).

We define the attacker A's
i ty
SCCA
A
i s said to be
( k ) is

by the probabilsecure if

in

is negligible.

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA’05)
1550-445X/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE

ci-

,

, ,,

The result of this

If

Model
As
Section
the PVRTF scheme
be
used to provide
(or prover's) privacy In PVRTE
identity ofthe prover is ambiguous The prover
message
of the
can
we assume
eligible
provers
resp denoted
= 1
The collection of provers denoted as
receiveis in the group, denoted as R , , = 1.
,
The collection ol'receivers denoted as
Any
can send a message on behalf of
This
message will then
verified

know about the identity ofthe prover
that
encrypted message was
encrypted message intended
If is
with this tact.
then
I S stored until
retrieved by
the
Finally. R,
the stored encrypted
by using his secret key
docs

for

Verifiable
of

A

6. Conclusion

algorithms,

a new scnerne

We

Our scheme is based
the non-interactive signature based on proof of knowledge
on equality of discrete logarithms and double discrete
that was proposed in this paper Our scheme
be easily extended to provide
that cannot be obtained using interactive schemes developed in the
work We
how to
it by combining ring
scheme with
verifiable I -out-of-n
scheme

References

"1

of three main

A

preceding step.

We note that similar result can be
by employing a ring
the
contribution
of this paper is to
how to
to
PVRTE. then
will
the detail
the ring
scheme in

5. An Extension: The Sender from A Ring

The Generic Construction for PVRTE Schemes
provide
generic
PVRTE
PV
schemes and ring
following

returns True

True or

Abe,
and
a Variety of Keys.
pages
- 432.2002.
J
Efficient and
group signatures.
in
'97, LNCS
479. 1997.
J Camenisch. Group
schemes and
systems based on the
problem.
thesis.
and I.
Verifiable encryption.
encryption. and their applications to separable group
and signature sharing schemes.
LNCS 1976. pages
J.
V. K.
D.
Verifiable encryption
J.

Verifiable
2004.
Wei, and D.
ifiable Encryption.

161 J . K

key
generic

as follows

V.

Custodian-I

Ver-

D. Pointcheval and Stern. Security arguments for
tal signatures
blind signatures.
2000.
M
Rabin. Digitalized signatures.
Academic Press. 1 978.
L.
A.
and
a Se191
cret.
in
pages
552 565,2001.

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA’05)
1550-445X/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE

